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Abstract: This paper describes a joint research campaign conducted by the German Aerospace Center
(DLR) and the National Research Council Canada (NRC) to explore methods and techniques to
expose rotorcraft pilot-induced oscillations (PIOs) during flight testing. A flight test campaign was
conducted at NRC using the Bell 205 experimental aircraft. Results show that, particularly for the
lateral axis, ADS-33 tasks can be successfully applied to expose PIO tendencies. Novel subjective
and objective criteria were used during the test campaign. PIO prediction boundaries of the objective
phase-aggression criteria (PAC) detection algorithm were validated through results obtained. This was
the first use of PAC with data recorded in-flight. To collect subjective feedback, the aircraft–pilot
coupling (APC) scale was used. This was the first use of the novel scale in-flight and received
favourable feedback from the evaluation pilot. Modifications to ADS-33 mission tasks were found to
successfully improve the ability to consistently expose PIOs.
Keywords: rotorcraft; pilot-induced oscillations; rotorcraft pilot couplings; flight test
1. Introduction
Aircraft/rotorcraft pilot couplings (A/RPCs) are defined as adverse, unwanted phenomena
originating from anomalous and undesirable couplings between the pilot and the vehicle [1]. The term
A/RPC encompasses all unfavourable vehicle responses that results from pilot control actions, whether
active or passive, within the control loop. The most recognized form of A/RPC is the pilot-induced
oscillation (PIO). The term refers to an oscillatory response which is characterised by an active pilot in
the control loop. A PIO requires the following pre-requisites to exist;
• An active pilot attempting to control the aircraft within the control loop.
• Unfavourable and undesirable response of the vehicle.
• An event or ‘trigger’ which causes oscillations to occur.
A good definition to distinguish between pilot commanded and pilot-induced oscillations is
given in Ref. [2]. In the former case, the pilot drives the oscillations. In the latter case, the pilot is
driven by the oscillations. Due to the requirement of an active pilot-in-the-loop, PIOs typically occur
between 1–10 rad/s [3]. Oscillations at higher frequencies typically involve a passive pilot, so called
Aerospace 2020, 7, 136; doi:10.3390/aerospace7090136 www.mdpi.com/journal/aerospace
Aerospace 2020, 7, 136 2 of 26
pilot-assisted oscillations (PAO, Ref. [4]). These types of oscillations are typically the result of flexible
aircraft dynamics or biodynamic response and are beyond the scope of the current study.
An overview of RPC events which have occurred during testing and operations is contained
in [5]. In addition, PIO/PAOs have recently been cited as the cause for a number of fatal accidents
during flight testing. In an accident of the Bell 525, biodynamic feedback caused PAO phenomena [6].
The fatal accident of the AW609 was found to be caused by divergent oscillations resulting from
coupling between the pilot and the flight control system during descending flight [7].
PIOs are also often not directly cited as the cause of accidents. Often the focus of analysis following
PIO events are the vehicle dynamics. Changes in vehicle dynamics may often be attributed as the
direct cause of the oscillations. However, it is also equally important to observe the other variables and
the situation where the PIO has occurred. As stated by McRuer and Jex [8], four additional variables
exist: task variables, environmental variables, operator-centred variables and procedural variables.
One problem found when performing PIO analysis and prediction is the difficulty in determining these
variables. Although many elements can be modelled (i.e., dynamic environment), a range of variables
cannot be accurately modelled (i.e., operator fatigue and motivation). For this reason, full scale in-flight
testing is still required to ensure PIO-free vehicles and ‘care-free’ handling qualities (HQs). A goal of
this research effort is to improve PIO testing techniques to ensure that these variables are accounted for.
Examples of research efforts in the field regarding RPCs include high fidelity modelling of
aeroelastic couplings ([9,10]), identification of pilot biodynamics and models ([11–13]), development of
prediction and detection tools ([14,15]) and development of design guidelines ([16,17]). The research
effort described in this paper concerns procedures and methods to ensure that PIO tendencies are
exposed during test and evaluation efforts and not during operations. Subsequently, the aim was to
develop suitable manoeuvre definitions, subjective assessment methods and objective measures for
flight testing.
As investigated in previous research [18–20], in this effort mission task elements (MTEs) and the
approaches defined to determine HQ deficiencies are used to expose underlying PIO tendencies.
Previous research has shown that tasks may require modifications to improve their usefulness
exposing PIOs [21,22]. Results showed that using standard tasks defined in HQ guidance specifications
(i.e., ADS-33E-PRF [23]) did not always expose PIOs. These efforts were limited to simulation studies.
In the study, a number of candidate MTEs were selected. Each of these MTEs was flown using
performance standards defined in ADS-33 [23]. In some cases, modifications were required to the
tasks due to both the vehicle and test course layout. Modifications are described in the Flight Test
Methodology section.
The paper proceeds as follows. Firstly, the test campaigns conducted using NRCs Bell 205 research
helicopter are discussed, including a description of the test vehicle, configurations and control systems
used for the tasks. Secondly, the objective and subjective analysis methods are discussed. Thirdly,
all results from the test campaign are presented. Further results, obtained during modifications to the
task performance, are discussed. Finally, conclusions and recommendations are provided.
2. Test Campaigns
The following section defines the aircraft, its control system configuration and the test environment
used to perform investigations.
2.1. Aircraft Description
The NRC Bell 205 (C-FPGV) is an experimental fly-by-wire (FBW) research facility operated by
the National Research Council of Canada (NRC). The aircraft is used to conduct HQ, control system
and autonomous systems research. A single engine utility helicopter, the basic airframe features a
Lycoming T-53-13A turboshaft engine (1250 SHP, takeoff rating) and has a maximum gross weight of
9500 lb. As depicted in Figure 1, the aircraft’s main rotor features a 2-bladed teetering design. During
its configuration as a research helicopter, the airframe was modified to improve its utility. This included
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removal of the main rotor stabilizer-bar, fixing the position of the horizontal stabilizer, installation of
high skid gear and the integration of Bell 212 main rotor blades. The fuel system, electrical system,
mechanical flight control runs, drive-train and power-plant remain essentially unmodified.
Figure 1. NRC Bell 205 airbourne simulator.
The aircraft’s variable stability architecture incorporates a single string (simplex) FBW
control system, a force-feel inceptor system and a safety system. The simplex architecture consists of
a set of four experimental actuators, a non-redundant flight control computer, aircraft state sensors
and flight management software. The implementation features separate flight critical electro–hydraulic
actuators attached to the mechanical control runs actuators attached in parallel to the mechanical
control runs and supplied by a dedicated high pressure hydraulic system. When the FBW system is
engaged with the evaluation pilot in control of the aircraft, the mechanical control runs are back driven
to allow the safety pilot to effectively monitor system performance. The benign HQs of the NRC Bell
205 allow the safety pilot to assume the major responsibility for flight envelope protection and safety.
A health monitoring unit computer is installed to perform safety system tasks such as actuator position
verification, command rate limiting, sensor consistency checking and command validation through use
of a predictive algorithm. The aircraft FBW actuation system incorporates spring override mechanisms
allowing the safety pilot to control the aircraft under all circumstances. To simulate flight control
mechanical characteristics, a programmable digitally-controlled pilot cyclic is installed in the aircraft.
Further information on the systems installed in the Bell 205 are available in [24].
2.2. Control System Configuration
The NRC Bell 205 control system was configured to allow variations in several parameters that
affect PIO tendency. These parameters included different response types (Attitude Command Attitude
Hold (AC) and Rate Damped (RD)), rate system bandwidth (as controlled by the rate gain) in both pitch
and roll and added system time delay. The evaluation pilot station was configured with standard cyclic,
collective and pedal controls during the trial. In the AC response type configuration, aircraft attitude is
proportional to stick input in the lateral and longitudinal axes. In the rate response type configuration,
the body axis rate of the aircraft is proportional to inceptor input in lateral and longitudinal axes.
Directional and vertical control remained constant throughout the investigation. For vertical control,
the collective featured heave damped response. For directional control, the pedals always featured
a rate damped response type. For all axes, control characteristics were altered by adjusting gearing
and damping. A simple model of the basic control structure is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. NRC Bell 205 basic simplified control structure.
During the trial, damping (KR) in both longitudinal and lateral cyclic control systems was
modified. This was to alter the aircraft bandwidth. All other axes remained at baseline settings
throughout. The goal was to achieve control system damping configurations that resulted in closed-loop
instabilities and pilot-induced oscillations during the execution of certain pilot tasks.
Higher system bandwidth could be achieved through increasing rate damping gains,
which subsequently leads to a lower steady state rate and a reduced time to achieve a stabilized
steady state rate for a given control input. Low damping was used to drive the control system towards
closed-loop instability (below structural mode excitation) in the axis selected. Reduction in bandwidth
is likely to increase PIO susceptibility, due to the slower response time following disturbance of
pilot control.
Prior to the completion of MTEs, step inputs and frequency sweeps were conducted to determine
the vehicle control power and bandwidth, respectively. The attitude captures were conducted for each
control system configuration to characterise the response.
The NRC Bell 205 aircraft control bandwidth settings are summarised in Figure 3 for the roll and
pitch axes. Four primary configurations were tested during the trial: Rate Damped (Baseline, RD),
Rate Damped Low (RDL), Rate Damped High (RDH) and Attitude Command Attitude Hold (AC).
HQ Levels were assessed using the ‘All Other MTE’ boundaries, contained within ADS-33E [23].
The baseline RD response provided Level 1 HQ in the roll axis and Level 2 HQs in the pitch axis.
The RDL setting provided Level 2 HQs, while the RDH was found to be within Level 1 for both pitch
and roll axes. The AC response provided Level 1 HQs in both axes. However, it should be considered
that high phase delay was found for the AC configuration. Studies detailed in Ref. [1] showed strong
susceptibility to PIO with phase delay greater than 200 ms.
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Figure 3. NRC Bell 205 calculated bandwidth plotted against ‘All Other mission task element (MTE)’
boundaries, (a) roll axis; (b) pitch axis.
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2.3. Flight Test Methodology
The test methodology outlined in ADS-33E-PRF [23], primarily for HQs analysis, was used in this
investigation. Previous investigations have shown the suitability of the test methodology for exposing
PIO tendencies. The trial was executed at the NRC low-speed test range located at its Uplands Campus
which is in proximity to the McDonald–Cartier International Airport in Ottawa (ON, Canada). It was
conducted using NRC’s low-speed test range. Occurring in early March 2019, weather conditions
consisted of air temperatures from −10 to −15 degrees Celsius and wind speeds from 6 to 20 knots,
with the test area covered in light snow. Orange traffic pylons were used to demarcate the ADS-33
test course.
Two sorties were conducted with an approximate flight time of four hours. Due to the time
available, it was only possible to complete formal evaluations using the ADS-33 MTEs with a single pilot.
A second pilot acted as a safety pilot throughout the tests. Although this pilot did not conduct any
formal evaluations, he supplied additional feedback regarding the test procedures and the use of
subjective opinion scales discussed below. Both pilots were qualified experimental test pilots and had
previously completed all manoeuvres and used all assessment scales employed during the tests.
Four MTEs were selected for the investigation: hover, lateral reposition, Pirouette and
Depart–Abort. A brief description of these manoeuvres is contained here for completeness.
The hover manoeuvre is used to check the ability to transition into hover and the ability to
maintain precise position, heading and altitude. The manoeuvre includes both a transition phase
(45◦ relative to heading at 6–10 kts) and a stable precise hover (for 30 s). The successful performance
is shown through visual markers located within the test area (see Figure 4). The lateral reposition
manoeuvre is used to check roll and heave axis handling qualities, alongside undesirable cross
couplings resulting from these axes. During the manoeuvre, the helicopter transitions from hover into
a stable lateral translation, followed by a deceleration to a stabilised hover. This is performed whilst
maintaining height and longitudinal position. The Pirouette manoeuvre is used to check precision in
all four axes simultaneously. The manoeuvre is similar to the lateral reposition, with the exception
that the translation is in a circular path and not purely laterally. The Depart–Abort manoeuvre is
used to check pitch and heave axis HQs. The manoeuvre requires the pilot to initiate a forwards
acceleration from hover (and reach 40–50 kts ground speed) before performing a deceleration to hover.
The rotorcraft should reach a stable hover prior to a reference position given by external markers.
Additionally, it is not acceptable to overshoot this point. Further and complete information addressing
all manoeuvres can be found in [23].
Figure 4. On-board view of elements of ADS-33 Hover test course used for evaluations.
The test course locations are shown in Figure 5. Due to Bell 205 performance and FBW limitations,
it was necessary to make modifications to some ADS-33E-PRF manoeuvres. The MTEs and associated
criteria are presented in Table 1. For the hover manoeuvre, the height criteria was modified due to
the command validation algorithm (CVA) of the FBW system used. Lower heights result in the CVA
disengaging the FBW, due to logic contained for safety purposes. The task hover height was set at
17 ft above ground. Both the lateral reposition and Pirouette were performed exclusively to the right
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to ensure the evaluation pilot’s view was unobstructed. The Depart–Abort was conducted as per
ADS-33 requirements.
Table 1. Trial mission tasks and criteria, taken from [23].
Task Criteria Desired Adequate
Precision Hover Heading ±5◦ ±10◦
Time (Decel., Hover) 5 s 8 s
Lateral Reposition Altitude ±10 ft ±15 ft
Heading ± 10◦ ±15◦
Longitudinal track ±10 ±20
Time (Complete) 18 s 22 s
Pirouette Altitude ±3 ft ±10 ft
Heading ±10◦ ±15◦
Time (Complete) 45 s 60 s
Time (Hover) 5 s 10 s
Depart Abort Altitude <50 ft <75 ft
Heading ±10◦ ±15◦
Time (Complete) 25 s 30 s
Rotor Speed 97–100% 91–97%
Figure 5. ADS-33 test course located at National Research Council (NRC), Ottawa.
During the flights the visibility was good; however, the useable cueing environment (UCE) was
degraded due to a recent light blanket of snow covering the ADS-33 course (visible in Figure 4).
During initial attempts of some of the manoeuvres, including Pirouette and hover, snow due to the
rotor downwash significantly affected the visibility. Before attempting any MTEs the majority of the
light snow was dispersed to prevent recirculating phenomenon and impact the UCE for the MTE. In
addition, to improve the usable cues on the ground, multiple run-on landings were conducted to create
texture and reference marks.
In order to determine whether sufficient cues were available to the pilot to perform the MTE,
additional UCE evaluations were made. These were necessary to ascertain whether the MTEs selected
could be attempted given the conditions. Evaluations were conducted using the general methodology
described in ADS-33 [23]. The process recommends that the UCE be conducted by three pilots and
the average result is awarded. In this investigation, it was only possible (due to time limitations) to
conduct the evaluation with a single pilot. This essentially modifies the process and subsequent results
obtained. For the case however, this was considered acceptable, to achieve an initial understanding as
to whether the cues were acceptable. The pilot confirmed this through detailed commentary.
Conditions were different on the two days, due to occasional falling snow. As a result, a UCE
evaluation was conducted both on Day 1 and Day 2. The Depart–Abort task was conducted only on
Day 1 and therefore the UCE was not repeated on Day 2. Results are shown in Table 2. As shown by
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the results, UCE was always found to be within Level 1 throughout the tests completed. Attitude cues
were unaffected by the conditions.
Table 2. Useable cueing environment (UCE) evaluation results.
Task Attitude Translational Vertical Overall
Pirouette (Day 1) 1 2 2 1
Pirouette (Day 2) 1 1 1 1
Hover (Day 1) 1 2 2 1
Hover (Day 2) 1 1 1 1
Lateral Reposition (Day 1) 1 2 1 1
Lateral Reposition (Day 2) 1 2 2 1
Depart/Abort (Day 1) 1 1 1 1
During the Pirouette manoeuvre, the aircraft’s FBW CVA would occasionally disengage the
control system due to the main rotor flap angle limit. For the same reason, it was also not possible to
complete the lateral reposition using the AC system.
2.4. Analysis Methods: Objective Evaluation
Quantitative data were gathered using the flight data recording system, and a separate DLR
Laptop-based payload, interfaced to the aircraft systems through an Ethernet connection. This enabled
in-situ testing of the phase-aggression criteria (PAC) algorithms.
For the objective evaluation of RPCs, data from both the pilot commands, aircraft response
and position were collected. Additional analysis of RPCs occurring was conducted using PAC.
For completeness, PAC is briefly described here.
PAC is a real-time capable method developed to detect PIOs in-flight. It was originally conceived
only as an analysis tool. However, it was shown through results that the method could be used
as a prediction or early warning system, to mitigate against severe and extreme PIOs, those which
could result in catastrophic failure or loss of control. The PAC method was originally based upon the
pilot-inceptor workload (PIW) theory proposed by Gray [25]. PIW has been successfully used as a tool
to allow pilots to assess their workload during flights at the United States Air Force Test Pilot School.
It has also been used as supplementary material during flight debriefing. PIW builds a 2-D picture of
the pilot control input response, by evaluating the pilot activity (duty cycle) and the pilot aggression.
In various publications, the definition of aggression differs, however it is always a general measure
of the input magnitude and rate of control inputs. The duty cycle is defined as the time for which
the pilot is considered to be active. This is typically determined through a lower force or position
threshold in the inceptor. The PIW can be either time varying (whereby on time step must be defined)
or can be the result of the complete evaluation run.
PIW alone is not sufficient to observe whether PIOs occur during the flight, as there is not
consideration for the vehicle output. Through definition, a mismatch between pilot and vehicle must
exist [3]. For this reason, PAC extends PIW by including information regarding the phase distortion
between the pilot input and the vehicle output. A schematic of the PAC is shown in Figure 6.
Through a number of simulation test campaigns, parameters to define the aggression of pilot
control input (AG) and the phase (Φ) between pilot input and vehicle (rate) output were defined.
Phase (Φ) is calculated in the time domain, using Figure 7. Here, the last oscillation cycle is used.
As defined in Ref. [21], using the last oscillation cycle, AG is the integral of the control input rate over
the sampling time period. This is calculated using Equation (1),
AG = Hs
1
t2 − t1
∫ t2
t1
|δ˙θ1c(1s)(t)|dt (1)
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where t1 and t2 are the start and end time of the current oscillation respectively, δ˙θ1c(1s) is the rate of
change of the control input and Hs is a scaling parameter.
Figure 6. Schematic of phase-aggression criterion (PAC) detection algorithm.
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Figure 7. Calculation of last oscillation cycle and phase.
The aggression can be calculated using either control position or force signals. In this investigation,
position signals have been used to conduct the analysis. Phase is calculated using Equation (2), where t3
is shown in Figure 7.
Φ = 360
t3
t2 − t1 (2)
In order to apply PAC to different types of helicopters, AG is scaled using the Hs parameter.
This is defined as the steady-state rate (primary axis) due to a perturbation in position (or force) of the
control inceptor. When using PAC with position input information, Hs is given by,
Hs =
∆p(q)
∆δθ1c(1s)
=
∆θ1c(1s)
∆δθ1c(1s)
∆p(q)
∆θ1c(1s)
(3)
where ∆p(q) is the change in roll (pitch) rate, ∆θ1c(1s) is the change in control swashplate angle
and ∆δθ1c(1s) is control position. This term is introduced to scale AG appropriately for different
helicopter types. The response of the helicopter (roll/pitch rates) is dependent both upon parameters
of the control system and the vehicle dynamics. An attack helicopter, for example, is likely to exhibit
higher angular rates than an transport helicopter. The subsequent magnitude of the oscillations for
a given control input will be larger. As AG is calculated using pilot control input, no information
regarding the resultant rates is directly observed. For this reason, the term Hs is introduced as an
approximation to account for this.
As in previous research, in this study Hs has been approximated as a constant value for
each of the control configurations. This has been calculated using the steady state response of
the helicopter to pilot control input. PAC boundaries to determine PIO incipience and subsequent
severity were determined in previous research [21]. Boundaries were defined using pilot subjective
opinion, both for longitudinal and lateral axes. Previous investigations were limited to simulation
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campaigns. This research effort is the first test campaign conducted to determine whether PAC
boundaries are suitable for in-flight testing.
2.5. Analysis Methods: Subjective Evaluation
In this investigation, two rating scales were used to determine the PIO susceptibility; the PIO
and adverse pilot coupling (APC) scales. Subjective scales were used to support the objective data
collected during each test run. For this research effort, the original version of the PIO scale was used.
This was first presented in 1967 and features only the use of descriptive terms [26]. The combined
scale [27] which was developed in 1981 and fits the original terms to a decision tree was not used due
to problems observed with its use in previous research efforts. The scale used is shown in Table 3.
The APC scale was presented in Ref. [21], developed by Jones and Jump as part of the
European Commission funded project, ARISTOTEL (Aircraft and Rotorcraft Pilot Couplings: Tools and
Techniques for Alleviation and Detection, Ref. [28]). It is shown in Figure 8. This scale was developed
specifically to account for drawbacks previously found with the PIO scale. The scale was also designed
to account for a broader range of APCs which may occur, and not restricting the use only to PIOs.
Within the APC scale, for example, non-oscillatory loss of control is also accounted for. The APC scale
was developed in collaboration with experimental test pilots, and was fully validated using previous
PIO assessment scales and objective data.
Table 3. Pilot-Induced Oscillation (PIO) Rating Scale. Reproduced from [26].
Description Rating
No tendency for pilot to induce undesirable motions. 1
Undesirable motions tend to occur when the pilot initiates abrupt manoeuvres or
attempts tight control. These motions can be prevented or eliminated but only at the
sacrifice to task performance or through considerable pilot attention and effort.
2
Undesirable motions easily induced when pilot initiates abrupt manoeuvres or attempts
tight control. These motions can be prevented or eliminated but only at the sacrifice to
task performance or through considerable pilot attention and effort.
3
Oscillations tend to develop when the pilot initiates abrupt manoeuvres or attempts
tight control. Pilot must open loop by releasing or freezing the stick.
4
Divergent oscillations tend to develop when the pilot initiates abrupt manoeuvres or
attempts tight control. Pilot must open loop by releasing or freezing the stick.
5
Disturbance or normal pilot control may cause divergent oscillations. Pilot must open
control loop by releasing or freezing the control stick.
6
For completeness, the key features of the APC scale are discussed here. The scale is structured
as a subjective decision tree, starting in the bottom left corner. It should always be ensured that the
pilot works through the decision tree, to fully justify the ratings obtained. The assessment of the APC
characteristics is based upon the experience of the pilot during the completion of the MTE. As with
previous RPC/PIO subjective assessment scales, the rating awarded is dependent upon the MTE.
The goal is that this dependency is prevalent in the APC scale. Firstly, the pilot is asked to state whether
uncontrollable or unpredictable motions occurred when entering the control loop. This indicates a
situation where APCs occurred during ‘open-loop’ control. In this case, the pilot is asked to state
whether the motions could not be suppressed (APC = 8) or if they led to loss of control (APC = 9).
If APCs were not experienced when entering the control loop (i.e., during open-loop control),
the pilot may attempt the MTE. At this point, s/he enters closed-loop control. For the segment where
the pilot attempts to/completes the manoeuvre, they are asked to decide whether undesirable and
unintentional vehicle response occurs. When this is not the case, a rating of APC = 1 is awarded to
indicate no issues were experienced during the completion of the MTE.
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When the pilot confirms that undesirable and unintentional response occurs, they are asked to
award a numerical rating between 4–7, which ranges from minor to severe oscillations. The numerical
rating is based upon the perceived severity of the oscillations. When the pilot awards a rating which
indicates RPCs have occurred during the completion of the MTE, they are also instructed to award an
accompanying letter. This letter describes the nature of any oscillations that have occurred. As the
characteristics of the oscillations (convergence/divergence) often have a significant effect on severity,
the results should indicate some dependency.
Figure 8. Adverse pilot coupling (APC) Scale.
Often extreme APCs may be suppressed through releasing the control inceptor or reducing the
‘pilot gain’ (in terms of frequency or amplitude of input). These terms are also included within the
PIO scale. In these cases, it may be required that the pilot must exit the task in order to suppress
oscillations and/or retain control of the vehicle. This situation is accounted for in the APC scale,
whereby an additional path may be taken providing the following condition,
“Oscillations experienced during the MTE cannot be suppressed without opening the control loop”
In this case, pilots may award APC = 8 or APC = 9, where the APC experienced has effectively
required the pilot to abandon the task and revert to open-loop control. As the pilot attempted to
complete the MTE, s/he is also asked to provide a letter.
This investigation was the first in-flight investigation using the APC scale. Previously, its use was
restricted to ground-based simulation facilities. For this reason, a goal of the test campaign was to
determine whether the scale could be successfully used in-flight and which improvements could be
made to increase its effectiveness during in-flight assessments.
In addition to PIO and APC ratings, Handling Qualities Ratings (HQRs) were collected for all test
points. This was to further support subjective results obtained, and to determine the degradation in
HQs resulting from the APCs experienced.
3. Results
This section details all results collected during the investigation. For further information, details
of all test points and accompanying pilot comments are contained within Appendix A.
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3.1. Calculation of Scaling Parameter Hs
In order to use PAC for objective analysis of data, Hs was first calculated using test data collected.
The parameter is used to scale AG to generalise the PAC results for use with different types of rotorcraft.
Although in this investigation only one aircraft was used, control system settings influenced the value
of Hs. Increases in rate damping led to a reduction in steady state control gain. For each of the
configurations, Hs was calculated from step inputs made by the evaluation pilot. It is assumed that the
relationship between pilot input and vehicle rate is constant, as an approximation. In reality, the value
of Hs is dependent upon the frequency and magnitude of control inputs. Table 4 shows the values of
Hs extracted from the test data. Previously, PAC boundaries have only been validated for rate-type
control command systems. Therefore, the AC results were not analysed using PAC. Validation effort
for use of PAC with AC systems is ongoing.
Table 4. Extracted values of Hs from step inputs.
Configuration Hs, lat (deg/s/deg) Hs, Long (deg/s/deg)
B205-RD 13.0 11.0
B205-RDL 22.0 12.0
B205-RDH 7.10 6.00
3.2. Subjective Ratings
Results from the investigation are shown in Table 5–7. These are with respect to task and vehicle
configuration. Table 5 shows HQRs collected. These were found to be marginally poorer than HQ
levels predicted through the use of ADS-33 bandwidth criteria. For both pitch and roll axis, Level 1
HQs were predicted for RDH and AC configurations. RD was predicted to have Level 1 HQs in the
roll axis and Level 2 in the pitch axis. RDL was predicted to have Level 1 HQs in both axes. All HQRs
awarded were within Level 2, varying from HQR = 4 to HQR = 6.
Table 5. Handling Qualities Ratings (HQRs) awarded.
Task Pirouette Hover Lat. Rep. Dep. Abort
B205-RD 5; 4 5 4 4
B205-RDL 6 5 4 n/a
B205-RDH 4 4 4 n/a
B205-AC 4 4 n/a n/a
APCR (Table 6) and PIOR (Table 7) ratings collected during the investigation were generally
found to be consistent: changes in APC ratings also led to changes in PIO ratings. APCR = 1 and
PIOR = 1 were found to be consistent throughout. The pilot awarded PIOR = 2 for the majority of cases
where APCR = 4 was awarded. PIOR 2 states that undesirable motions can be prevented or eliminated
at the sacrifice of task performance. The term oscillations is not included in the description. Using the
APC scale, the pilot must subjectively assess whether oscillations occurred during task completion or
associated attempts. When the pilot states that undesirable oscillations occurred, the best rating which
may be awarded is APCR = 4.
When awarding PIOR = 4, for the same case the pilot awarded APCR = 7C. Using the PIOR scale,
the difference between PIOR = 4 and PIOR = 5 is due to the subjective evaluation of whether the
pilot believed the oscillations experienced were divergent. In this case, the pilot awarded APCR = 7C,
stating that the oscillations are sustained and not divergent. The APC rating shows that the oscillations
were severe, and required a high level of adaptation. This information regarding severity is not directly
conveyed using the PIOR scale.
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Table 6. APCRs awarded.
Task Pirouette Hover Lat. Rep. Dep. Abort
B205-RD 5A; 5D 4A 4A 2
B205-RDL 7C 4B 4B n/a
B205-RDH 2 1 4A n/a
B205-AC 1 4B n/a n/a
Table 7. PIORs awarded.
Task Pirouette Hover Lat. Rep. Dep. Abort
B205-RD 3; 2 2 2 2
B205-RDL 4 2 2 n/a
B205-RDH 2 1 2 n/a
B205-AC 1 2 n/a n/a
3.3. MTE Suitability
3.3.1. Pirouette
From the manoeuvres flown, the Pirouette was found to expose the most severe PIOs. The task
successfully exposed differences between configurations, correctly displaying the expected trend in
terms of PIO susceptibility. For the case, B205-RDH, no PIO tendencies were observed. Here, the pilot
commented that undesirable motions were present but they did not result in oscillations. Following
a reduction in control damping, the pilot awarded APCR = 5A and APCR = 5D. This suggests that
on one occasion the pilot experienced convergent oscillations while on another divergent oscillations.
The pilot stated in both cases that the oscillations were moderate, requiring considerable adaptation.
Figure 9 shows both the data recorded and PAC results for the roll axis during the case where
the pilot awarded APCR = 5D. Each diamond in Figure 9b represents a measured oscillatory peak.
Looking at the data trace, roll oscillations are found throughout the manoeuvre. Divergent oscillations
are present at periods throughout, particularly between t = 50 s and t = 60 s supporting the pilot’s
subjective rating. However, for the majority of the run, oscillations are sustained or convergent.
PAC results are shown in Figure 9b. Points are plotted against boundaries defined for the roll axis.
As shown, the majority of points occur in the moderate PIO region which supports the rating
APCR = 5D. For this case, the pilot reported that classical low frequency PIO occurred in the lateral axis.
No PIO was reported in the longitudinal axis. This is supported through results shown in Figure 10b.
Here, the data trace and PAC results are shown for the pitch axis. Results are plotted against pitch
PAC boundaries, which differ slightly from roll boundaries.
During the Pirouette manoeuvre, several severe PIOs occurred due to gusting wind conditions.
These occurred when flying with the B205-RDL configuration (lowest bandwidth, Level 2).
Figure 11 shows a comparison between one of the severe PIOs (Day 1, Case 48) recorded and a
case where no lateral PIO was reported (Day 1, Case 35). The two cases show large differences in
lateral control input, roll rate and roll attitude. During Case 48, the gusting wind caused PIOs to occur
throughout the manoeuvre. The pilot could not suppress these PIOs, which occurred during and prior
to the manoeuvre and during the manoeuvre. PAC results are shown in Figure 11c. Here, PAC points
are predominantly within the Severe PIO region. For this case, the pilot awarded APCR = 7C, severe
sustained oscillations. The pilot stated that oscillations did not cause him to abandon the task, but they
were sustained throughout. Prior to the completion of the test point, wind conditions caused CVA safety
trips which initially prevented the pilot from attempting the Pirouette. As a preventative measure,
the pilot repositioned the helicopter relative to the critical wind azimuth. Although this allowed the
manoeuvre to be attempted, it could not be completed. The ground track of the helicopter, for both
Case 35 and Case 48 is shown in Figure 12. Less than half of the Pirouette could be completed during
the case where PIO occurred.
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Figure 13 shows APCRs obtained following (attempted) completion of the Pirouette manoeuvre
with respect to roll bandwidth. ADS-33 HQ level boundaries are also presented. Results show a
relationship between bandwidth and severity of oscillations. For the case with Level 2 predicted HQs
(i.e., bandwidth lower than 2 rad/s), severe oscillations were experienced. Although the B205 AC case
exhibited large phase delay, this was not found to result in PIOs during the completion of the Pirouette.
It should be noted that on Day 1 of the flight tests (with strong wind), the manoeuvre could not be
completed due to multiple system trips.
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Figure 9. Case 24-lateral axis-APC = 5D, (a) time recording; (b) PAC results.
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Figure 10. Case 24-longitudinal axis, (a) time recording; (b) PAC results.
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Figure 11. Comparison of example No PIO and severe PIO cases. (a) Comparison of time responses;
(b) PAC results for Case 35, lateral, No PIO; (c) PAC results for Case 48, lateral, severe PIO.
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Figure 13. APC ratings obtained from the Pirouette MTE w.r.t. roll bandwidth.
3.3.2. Hover
The hover manoeuvre also led to PIOs during the investigation. Ratings awarded by the pilot
suggested that the oscillations were not as severe as those encountered during the Pirouette manoeuvre.
According to ADS-33 [23], the standard hover manoeuvre is a limited agility manoeuvre, which is
suitable for all types of rotorcraft. The Pirouette is a moderate agility manoeuvre, whereby it is expected
that the pilot must be more aggressive in order to obtain performance requirements. In previous
simulation investigations, it has been suggested that the hover requirements are not stringent enough
to consistently encounter PIOs, whereby pilot strategy largely determines whether PIOs are (or are
not) experienced [21]. For the case where APCR = 7C was awarded during the Pirouette, the same
pilot awarded APCR = 4B. This suggests that the task performance requirements for the hover exposed
convergent PIOs and not sustained severe PIOs. PAC was also used to post-process results obtained.
Some examples are shown for two cases in Figure 14. PAC results are shown for both lateral and
longitudinal axes (i.e., Case 24, APCR = 1 and Case 23, APCR = 4B). During completion of Case 23,
the pilot commented that he experienced PIO in the yaw and pitch axes. To date, the use of PAC
has not been extended to determine PIO susceptibility in the yaw axis. Inspection of PAC results
show that PIO also occurred in the roll axis, at higher severity than suggested from pilot comments.
Using this configuration (B205-RDL), PIOs were expected during completion of the task (as shown in
the Pirouette). Inspection of the data confirmed large phase distortion and out-of-phase control inputs
throughout the task, which appeared to converge once hover had been achieved. For the same case,
PIOs in the longitudinal axis were confirmed through the PAC boundaries (moderate PIO).
3.3.3. Lateral Reposition
Like the hover and Pirouette manoeuvres, the lateral reposition exposed PIOs predominantly in
the roll axis. One lateral reposition was flown on Day 1, where PIOs were exposed due to gusting wind.
This was found for B205-RD case. Figures 15 and 16 show the results obtained, both the data trace
and PAC. For this case, the pilot awarded APC = 4A, suggesting convergent moderate oscillations. It is
not expected that these oscillations would cause a significant problems. Despite the rating awarded
by the pilot, large oscillations are shown from approximately t = 20 s, which are generally sustained
until the manoeuvre is complete. Analysis using PAC shows moderate oscillations were experienced
(with one point recorded in the Severe region). During the lateral reposition, the helicopter achieved
larger angular attitudes than during the (desired) completion of the Pirouette manoeuvre. For this
reason, the task could not be completed using the Attitude Command (B205-AC) system, due to
multiple CVA FBW system trips.
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Figure 14. Comparison between PAC results for Rate Damped High (RDH) and Rate Damped
Low (RDL) configurations recorded during the completion of the hover manoeuvre. (a) Day 2-Case
24-RDH-long; (b) Day 2-Case 23-RDL-long; (c) Day 2-Case 24-RDH-lat; (d) Day 2-Case 23-RDL-lat.
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Figure 15. Results from lateral reposition, Case 77-Day 1-APC = 4A. (a) Time recording; (b) PAC results.
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Figure 16. Results from lateral reposition-Case 41, Day 2-APC = 4B. (a) Time recording; (b) PAC results.
3.3.4. Depart–Abort
The Depart–Abort task was tested only during Day 1. Predominantly this was due to time
available during flight tests, whereby the tasks were prioritised. During tests on Day 1, the pilot stated
that the task appeared to be the least applicable to investigate PIO. The task was selected to expose
longitudinal PIO. The pilot stated that the task requirements following rapid deceleration were not
stringent enough to force continuous workload and therefore would not consistently expose PIOs.
Figure 17 shows both the data trace and the PAC results for the longitudinal axis for the completed
manoeuvre. PAC results confirm the pilot subjective comments that PIO was not exposed in the
longitudinal axis during the manoeuvre.
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Figure 17. Results from Depart–Abort, longitudinal, Case 73 APC = 2. (a) Time recording-Case 73;
(b) PAC results for Case 73.
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3.4. Results Summary
Table 8 shows a comparison between PAC detections and APC ratings. PAC results from all cases
where calculated, both for pitch and roll axis. These results was compared to the APCR, with respect
to MTE. The table shows whether the PAC result was found in the roll, pitch, or both axes. General
agreement was found between PAC and APC ratings. For the lateral reposition manoeuvre, PAC did
not detect PIO despite the pilot rating of APCR = 4A (in both pitch and roll). Furthermore, for the
Depart–Abort, the pilot did not to recognise a roll PIO (again due to gusting wind), which was detected
as moderate oscillations by PAC.
Table 8. Summary of PAC PIO detection w.r.t. pilot ratings.
PAC Pirouette Hover Dep. Abort Lat. Rep.
No 2 (roll) 1 n/a 4A (both)
Mod. 5A (roll) 4A (both) 2 (roll) 4A, 4B (roll)
Sev. 7C (roll) 4B (roll) n/a n/a
From the results obtained, global success rate, index of conservatism and safety index were
determined, to assess the suitability of PAC boundaries. This method was used to previously validate
boundaries during simulation campaigns [21]. Table 9 shows the objective PAC PIO detections with
respect to the subjective pilot evaluations. The numerical values show the number of ratings obtained
for each of the pairs (objective/subjective result). The goal is to achieve correlation between objective
and subjective assessment. Overall, the boundaries were found to reflect the pilot comments and
subjective ratings.
Table 9. Comparison between PAC detections and pilot subjective ratings.
Subjective APC Rating
No PIO PIO
Objective PAC No PIO 2 (x) 1 (w)
PIO 1 (y) 6 (z)
From the results shown in Table 9, the correlation between objective and subjective metrics can
be determined using three measures: global success rate, index of conservatism and safety index.
These are calculated as follows;
• Global Success Rate (GSR): (x+z)/(w+x+y+z) = 80% (8/10) the percentage of cases which
agreement between subjective and objective measures is found, where the vehicle is determined
to be either PIO prone or PIO free.
• Index of Conservatism (IoC): z/(y+z) = 85% (6/7), the percentage of cases where PIO has been
identified subjectively with respect to the total number of cases observed by both objective and
subjective PIO-prone cases.
• Safety Index (SI): z/(w+z) = 85% (6/7), the percentage of cases where PIO has been identified
objectively with respect to the total number of cases observed by both objective and subjective
PIO-prone cases.
Additional analysis was conducted through assessment of average PAC results. Although PAC
is designed as a real-time and time-varying analysis method, the average parameters from the test
runs may be used to give an indication of the PIO susceptibility for a given case. Comparison between
two cases regarding the phase and aggression can give an indication of how parameter changes have
influenced pilot control. Figure 18 shows the average PAC parameters for MTEs conducted on Day 1
of the test campaign. These were cases where PIOs were predominantly in the lateral axis. The most
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severe PIOs were experienced during the completion of the Pirouette with B205-RDL case (Cases 48–52).
As shown, these cases appear in the severe PIO region.
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Figure 18. Average PAC parameters obtained during completion of manoeuvres, Day 1.
4. Task Modification
As previously discussed, during the completion of standard ADS-33 manoeuvres, oscillations were
found to be most severe during the Pirouette task. This is classified as a moderately aggressive MTE.
PIOs exposed during the hover task, although apparent, were not as severe. The hover task is classified
as a low aggression task. Previous work has suggested modifications to the task to improve its
suitability to expose PIOs. In Ref. [21], the hover task was modified through repositioning of the
reference pole. This causes a reduction in tolerances and was found to increase the incipience of PIOs
during completion of the hover element.
To improve the suitability of the manoeuvre, to consistently expose underlying PIOs,
two modifications to the task were tested. Firstly, the transition speed was increased from 6–10 kts
to 13–17 kts. This modification is referred to as fast transition (FT). Secondly, the task performance
requirements during the hover were modified, tightening the tolerances and forcing the pilot to increase
his gain during the hover segment of the task. This modification is referred to as half tolerances (HT).
During the test campaign, it was not possible to physically modify the test course. For this reason,
the pilot mentally visualised the modified task performance requirements.
The comparison of data collected for two modified tasks, in addition to the completed hover
using ADS-33 tolerances, is shown in Figure 19.
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Figure 19. Comparison of results obtained from three hover manoeuvres.
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The coupled roll and pitch axis precision hover average (absolute mean) responses for the 30 s
stabilization period, during which time the pilot is tracking the hover board target, are depicted
in Figure 20. Comparing AC (RUN 30) and RD (RUN 72 and RUN 54) response types, pitch oscillations
dominate vehicle attitude response. The AC response type, an augmented mode, produces about
half the oscillatory roll response of the RD response type. Comparing RD (RUN 72) and RD with
150 milliseconds of time delay (RUN 54), a 0.75 to 1 degree increase in average roll oscillatory response
is depicted, while the pitch oscillatory response remains largely unchanged.
Figure 20. Pitch and roll axis oscillatory response, hover, 30 s stabilization period.
Subjective results are shown in Figure 21 with respect to task. The influence of the task
performance parameter modification is shown through changes to the ratings. By increasing the
hover translation speed, the HQR increases from HQR = 5 to HQR = 6. The reduction of tolerances
during the hover element increased the HQR from HQR = 5 to HQR = 7. This is a reduction in HQ Level.
The tightened tolerances during the hover element also changed the severity and nature of oscillations.
Using the ADS-33 guidelines, oscillations were classified as moderate and convergent. After the
modifications, the pilot stated that oscillations were severe and sustained during the completion of
the manoeuvre.
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Figure 21. Comparison of results obtained from three hover manoeuvres completed using the
same configuration.
5. Discussion
During the test campaign, the first in-flight evaluations using the APC scale were performed.
Valuable pilot feedback was collected on the applicability and utility of the scale during PIO
investigations. During the test campaign, only the evaluation pilot assigned ratings using
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the scale. However, during briefing and debriefing, the safety pilot provided additional comments
and suggestions.
Generally, both pilots were in agreement that the APC scale solves a number of issues concerning
the legacy PIO scale. In this investigation, both scales were used to allow direct comparison. The legacy
scale in tabulated form eliminates some of the known problems relating to the use of the subjective
decision tree [29]. However, using the tabulated scale, the pilots must award a rating based upon the
closest subjective description to the observed PIO. Inevitably, there elements of ambiguity, and not all
cases feature all characteristics described in the rating. It is often the case that an observed PIO can fit
into the description within 2–3 ratings (of which there are only 6), meaning that the variation can be high
across several test pilots, leading to poor data quality and poor reliability. The addition of the decision
tree to the legacy scale (not used in this investigation) provides the opposite consequences, whereby
the pilots are forced to assign at rating, regardless of the perceived severity. Unlike the Cooper–Harper
scale, the pilot does not have any option to subjective award the final rating. The APC scale solves this
problem using a decision tree format followed by pilot subjective opinion. The intention is to allow
for pilots to use their experience and knowledge to provide assessment, but to reduce the amount of
ratings that the pilots may assign. As the questions are based on performance and factual observations,
the subjective opinion is minimised, resulting in a decreased variation across several pilots when
compared to the legacy rating scale.
The scale also brings focus to the mission task requirements, highlighting the fact that the rating
is dependent on these requirements and not a general assessment. Mission task requirements are not
prominent in the legacy scale, and the ability of the pilot to adequately perform requirements is not
used as a factor in the assessment. The severity of a PIO is directly related to the task that is being
flown (and the pilot feedback gain required for the task). The APC rating reflects the ability of the
pilot to complete/abandon an MTE and the performance standards achieved. For this reason, it is
clear that any assigned APC rating is only applicable when associated with a specific MTE course
description and performance standards. This reduces the ambiguity of the assigned rating, providing
a clear indication of the situation where PIO incipient conditions are experienced.
Despite favouring the APC scale, pilots did provide suggestions for modifications, particularly
concerning the phrasing and wording included. Firstly, pilots were not completely in agreement as
to the meaning of the term ‘adaptation’. They expressed that this should be included with the scale.
Adaptation is defined as the degree to which the pilot is required to modify their behaviour and strategy.
As contained in Ref. [21];
“If the pilot need not apply any changes to their control or task strategy, this represents negligible
adaptation (i.e., they do not need to respond to oscillations). Considerable pilot adaptation refers to
the situations where the pilot must consciously act to suppress the oscillations, but may have spare
capacity to complete some other tasks.”
One of the pilots commented that the jump from negligible to considerable pilot adaptation
is large. In the Cooper–Harper HQR scale, gradual increments are made using the terms minimal,
moderate, considerable, extensive. The terms should be compared with those used in the APC scale.
The pilot questioned whether using the same terminology contained in the HQR scale could provide
a benefit, providing standardisation of terms.
Similarly, the pilot also questioned the best way to interpret the additional letter terms.
These terms are intended to characterise the oscillations. In particular, what should be pilot state when
oscillation have changed due to the pilot adaptation. For example, without adaptation, divergent
oscillations occur which become sporadic following a change in control strategy. The way in which
the rating should be applied is ambiguous. It is the intention that the oscillations experienced prior to
adaptation should be provided as feedback. Clearer guidance regarding this point will be used when
performing further investigations with the APC scale.
During the investigations, MTEs were taken directly from ADS-33. These were selected as they
have well known accepted performance requirements, deemed to reflect those requirements for current
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operational rotorcraft. The standards are accepted worldwide and used to determine whether vehicles
exhibit deficiencies or carefree handling. Some of the ADS-33 task performance requirements also
include additional statements regarding undesirable oscillations (i.e., desired performance for the
hover manoeuvre).
Whilst the manoeuvres are standardised, the requirements reflect typical expected performance.
PIOs often occur following unexpected conditions, often forced by the trigger situation. In order to
simulate performance closer to the operational limits of the vehicle, task performance requirements of
the hover manoeuvre were modified. These modifications were considered to still reflect operational
requirements for utility rotorcraft. Pilots considered that the increase in translation speed had a
minor effect on HQ and PIO ratings. PIOs when identified had a convergent nature, often suppressed
following a short period. During the completion of the task with increased translational speed,
performance must be carefully observed to ensure that pilots to do commence the deceleration early to
avoid exposing oscillations.
Decreasing longitudinal and lateral performance tolerances had a greater effect than changing
the translation speed. The change forced the pilot to increase the feedback gain throughout the hover
section and maintenance. As the modification to the task was applied to the maintenance phase, it had
a longer term effect and hence produced more sustained PIOs.
As previously stated, the APCRs awarded when using the scale are dependent upon the task
performance requirements. When performing tasks as contained in ADS-33 to observe HQ deficiencies,
it is acceptable for the pilot to aim to achieve adequate performance tolerances when they are unable
to obtain desired performance. This must be demonstrated before the pilot is permitted to fly the task
to achieve only adequate performance tolerances. The practice is necessary when awarding HQRs.
Regarding PIOs, this has the potential to suppress oscillations and subsequently impacts the APC
rating obtained. Therefore, when performing tests to expose PIOs, the following should be observed;
“Desired and adequate performance standards are required to ensure that the vehicle is flown to known
requirements. The pilot should always attempt to achieve desired performance standards, even if these
cannot be attained.”
6. Conclusions
This paper presents results obtained from a joint test campaign conducted by researchers from
NRC Canada and DLR. The work is part of an ongoing collaboration between the organisations.
Flight tests were conducted to test and validate methods to assess subjectively and objectively the
incipience and severity of aircraft/rotorcraft pilot coupling (A/RPC) events. Specifically during these
tests, pilot-induced oscillations (PIOs) were of interests. The flights were conducted in March 2019
using the Bell 205 experimental helicopter, operated and maintained by the NRC. The following are
the key conclusions from this research effort;
• The boundaries developed for use with PAC from simulation campaigns were found to be
suitable for in-flight investigations. Results obtained validated boundaries previously developed
from simulation campaigns only. This was shown for a range of vehicle control configurations.
Correlation was found for both cases where no PIO and PIO were experienced. For this reason,
the boundaries are considered suitable for in-flight investigations.
• The adverse pilot coupling (APC) scale was used for the first time during in-flight investigations.
The scale was found to successfully solve limitations found with the legacy PIO scale.
Pilots, however, commented that further improvements to the APC scale could be beneficial
to further improve its utility.
• Four mission task elements (MTEs) from ADS-33E were employed. From these manoeuvres,
the Pirouette was found to be the most suitable to expose PIOs. During the attempted completion
of the task, severe and sustained PIOs were experienced. Both the hover and lateral reposition
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manoeuvres were found to be suitable to expose PIOs. The Depart–Abort was considered less
successful, due to the performance parameters associated with the manoeuvre.
• The hover MTE was modified to improve its suitability to expose PIOs. The standard manoeuvre
is considered to be low aggression. Two modifications were made to the task; an increase in
transition speed and a reduction in allowable hover tolerances. The latter modification was found
to expose larger and more sustained PIOs.
The study described in the paper was limited due to available flying hours. In the future, it is
recommended that further and more detailed tests be conducted to modify the ADS-33 MTEs to
improve their suitability to expose RPCs. Furthermore, as previously discussed, pilots commented
that modifications to the APC scale could be beneficial. This will be investigated in future research.
In this work, only simplistic PIO ‘triggers’ were used (i.e., time delays), as the focus was on tool and
technique development. Further research should focus on testing of dynamic PIO ‘triggers’, such as
mode switching and failures. Some recent research efforts have been conducted using simulation [30]
and it is planned to continue this research through further in-flight testing.
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APC(R) Adverse pilot coupling (Rating)
A/RPC Aircraft/rotorcraft pilot coupling
ARISTOTEL Aircraft and Rotorcraft Pilot Couplings: Tools and Techniques for Alleviation and Detection
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DLR Deutsches Zentrum fuer Luft und Raumfahrt (German Aerospace Center)
FBW Fly-by-wire
FT Fast transition
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NRC National Research Center Canada
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PAO Pilot-assisted oscillation
PIO(R) Pilot-induced oscillation (Rating)
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RD Rate Damped
RDH Rate Damped High
RDL Rate Damped Low
UCE Usable cueing environment
Appendix A
P = Pirouette H = Hover D = Depart–Abort L = Lateral reposition HT = Half tolerances FT = Fast
transition 150, 300 = Time Delay, ms
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Table A1. Day 1: 4th March 2019, Aircraft Bell 205A, C-FYZV.
Run Configuration M HQR APCR PIOR Comments
13–15 B205-RD P 5 5A 3 UCE 1, high frequency pitch PIO/PAO caused
by loose hand grip and vibration of aircraft.
24–25 B205-RD P 4 5D 2 Classical low frequency PIO in lateral axis,
longitudinal control B205-RDH.
30–35 B205-RDH P 4 2 2 n/a
47–52 B205-RDL P 6 7C 4 Tripped out several times. Finally attempted
manoeuvre and completed with only half a turn
in 30 s, due to trips associated gusts.
65–67 B205-AC P - - - Pirouette not possible due to system trips.
68–72 B205-RD H 5 4A 2 UCE 1, oscillations caused undesirable
oscillations with PIO in multiple axes.
73, 74 B205-RD D 4 2 2 Minor lateral disturbances. Low pilot gain
required due to relaxed tolerances to complete
manoeuvre to desired standards.
75–77 B205-RD L 4 4A 2 Cross wind a factor-exposed more lateral
oscillations that the hover in wind during the
depart abort.
Table A2. Day 2: 5th March 2019, Aircraft Bell 205A, C-FYZV.
Run Configuration M HQR APCR PIOR Comments
15–17, 24 B205-RDH H 4 1 1 First case difficult due to the poor horizontal
VCR (2), fore-aft stabilization requires
significant pilot concentration. Pilot needs
to look at the cones more regularly, instead
of using peripheral cues. Subsequent
attempts (24) completed after making
markings in the snow.
18–23 B205-RDL H 5 4B 2 PIO felt in yaw axis / fore aft axis
25–30 B205-AC H 4 4B (yaw)
2 (pitch)
2 Achieving the hover element of the task
was an issue, workload reduces during
the hover. Small oscillations not a major
problem. Yaw oscillations apparent.
31–35 B205-AC P 4 1 1 All attempts except last were aborted due to
CVA trips. Due to controller and not PIOs.
36–40 B205-RDH L 4 4A 2 First event poorer UCE (Att. 1, Horz. 3,
Vert. 2, UCE 1). Al subsequent attempts
made after marking snow. Throughout
attempts pilot was gradually increasing the
aggression to accelerate.
41–43 B205-RDL L 4 4B 2 PIO in lateral mainly during the acceleration
and deceleration.
44–48 B205-AC L - - - Task abandoned due to multiple CVA trips.
54 B205-RD + 150
ms
H 5 5C 3 Longitudinal and lateral axis oscillations at
the same frequencies.
55–57 B205-RD + 300
ms
H 8 7D 4 Struggled to maintain adequate. Multi-axis
aggravated yaw
58, 59 B205-RD + FT H 4 1 1 Hover with 13–17 kts.
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Table A2. Cont.
Run Configuration M HQR APCR PIOR Comments
60–64 B205-RDH +
150 ms + FT
H 6 6B 4 8 s to stabilise.
65 B205-RDH +
150 ms
H 5 5B 3 PIO in yaw, possibly roll and pitch.
67, 71 B205-RDH +
HT
H 5 5B 3 Cyclic movement predominantly in pitch
axis but with some lateral. Half tolerances
in height, horizontal position but standard
heading.
72 B205-RDH +
150 ms + HT
H 7 7C 4 Striving for the desired tolerance drove
up the feedback gain and caused a PIO.
If the pilot had accepted the adequate
tolerances, the gain would have probably
been lower and so the PIO would probably
not have developed so aggressively. Half
tolerances in height and horizontal position,
standard heading.
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